Indicators: Conduit Toolbar

Conduit Toolbar. The name alone is enough to make me wince. The name should ring a bell if you have ever been in any kind of support position or if one of your relatives started to complain about a slow internet browser and asks you to remove "this weird toolbar." So what is Conduit and what is this toolbar?

I haven't done much research on the company itself, but a Google search for "conduit toolbar" will show you just how many people search for this crapware, and how many people have created a "how-to" in order to uninstall the application. The company (Conduit) has a very plain page without offering much detail and appears to be affiliated with a company called Como, which helps businesses create smart phone apps. Whatever, I don't care. I just want the network indicators.

The main reason why I created this post was to, obviously, show you some network indicators for this toolbar. I had a hard time finding any kind of information about indicators for the toolbar; almost all of the sites that I found had information on how to uninstall the toolbar. What does the toolbar do? Well it is pretty malicious and transmits sensitive data to a remote server. File analysis shows that it will attempt to see if a virtual machine is running (anti-forensics), will steal private information from your web browser, fingerprint your system (BIOS, MachineGUID), and even modify your proxy settings. Yeah, this is a nice piece of software. On to the network indicators!

Domains Contacted / HTTP URI Paths:
The following domains are contacted after installation and for application updates. The HTTP URI paths below each domain have been observed for those specific domains.

• sp-storage.conduit-services.com
• /autoupdate/
• sp-storage.spccinta.com
• /autoupdate/
• sp-storage.spccint.com
• /autoupdate/
• servicemap.conduit-services.com
• /sp/
• /sptray/
• servicemap.spccint.com
• /sp/
• /sptray/
• sp.api.search.conduit.com
• /up/settings/?ctid=
• sp-alive-msg.conduit-data.com
• sp-alive-msg.databssint.com
• sp-autoupdate.conduit-services.com
• /autoupdate/
• /update/
• sp-autoupdate.spccint.com
• /autoupdate/
• /update/
• sp-ip2location.conduit-services.com
• /ip/?client=sp
• sp-ip2location.spccint.com
• /ip/?client=sp
• sp-settings.conduit-services.com
• /searchprotectorsettings/
• /carrier/
• /plugins/
• sp-settings.spccint.com
• /searchprotectorsettings/
• /carrier/
• /plugins/
• sp-translation.conduit-services.com
• /?locale=
• sp-usage.databssint.com

HTTP User-agent String:

• Starts with: "SearchProtect"
• Users a semi-colon as a field separator
• Breakdown of user-agent string values:
• SearchProtect;<Application Version>;<OS type and version>;<Unique identifier>
• Example:
• SearchProtect;1.7.1.50;Microsoft Windows 7 Professional;SP1A9B0A2A-43A1-4D4B-C21B-4CAEDF6B9192
• Regex to find the unique identifier on the user-agent string:
• ([a-zA-Z0-9]{10}\-[a-zA-Z0-9]{4}\-[a-zA-Z0-9]{4}\-[a-zA-Z0-9]{4}\-[a-zA-Z0-9]{12})

File Downloaded:

An associated file that is downloaded for updating is retrived from the following sites:

• sp-storage.conduit-services.com
• sp-storage.spccinta.com
• sp-storage.spccint.com

Download activity is accomplished thorugh an HTTP GET request over port 80 for the file name "autoupdate.zip."

Further Reading:

• autoupdate.zip file analysis:
• https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/f78da944c348e7f9df99c1c9073f47b25c95f9d44567c6c48d3ab4746237b03b/analysis/
• https://malwr.com/analysis/MjBmZjYwZDg2ZmNjNDJlYzgyZWU1NmQ3YmQwYTViMTc/
• https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/sample/49ef551698fe7b2530991d5436b54284f722ab5e4ea951802677c3a6a8e5489b?environmentId=5

Indicators - Banking Trojan

Threat: Banking Trojan / ZeuS

These domain requests lit up the DNS logs. After executing an executable file from an email, the malware will attempt many DNS requests to the below sites. There are some good indicators here, along with some regex to help you find the activity in your logs or PCAP files.

Network Analysis:

The malware will make multiple DNS type A queries and HTTP POST connections to the following second level domains (SLDs):

• dwhxopmcgpix
• hrjyvfeduuts
• ipjbvvnjobll
• jmdwnsmripqn
• lgccwnffuuwx
• ncdebbobqmyi
• njbkkylgqqqp
• nmhvbbgccckx
• nnqksrgtdhjk
• omiwfmnejorf
• owvcjnfuwtoo
• pckffwcqdebn
• pdvxqjnssltt
• piwxvumpyptp
• ruutsckgffnj
• smqwonbiiymq
• ttsjrnffxovu
• wwxthsqmupii

Now, each one of these SLDs is followed by one of four top level domains (TLDs):

• .com
• .in
• .net
• .ru

So all together it will constantly make 72 DNS type A requests. It will also make a single request to the following host:

• f02783mat0i5r1t.cc

There is also a unique HTTP URI path used when the malware attempts to make HTTP requests:

• /for193gd63891mat/

Observations:

Each SLD is 12 characters long followed by one of the above four TLDs; the odd ball domain (f02783mat0i5r1t.cc) is the only exception. The SLDs contain all characters in the English alphabet except for the 'a' and 'z' characters; again the f02783mat0i5r1t.cc domain is the only exception.  All HTTP requests are POST over port 80.

Regex:

The following regex should find any of the above hosts.

• ([b-y]{12})([\.](com|in|net|ru))

Further Information:

• Malwr Analysis: https://malwr.com/analysis/MjljZjM1MTA3OWE2NGUwN2IyNDkwZDZlMzU4ZWU0NDY/
• Virustotal Analysis: https://www.virustotal.com/en/file/d445d97c79e6578a194e85619ab0183d930ac4041b73210582f04b4a6d6300ad/analysis/

Houdini Tracker Update

Just a quick post to let you know that I have added a few more indicators to the Houdini RAT tracking list.

Enjoy! I will be updating with another indicator list pretty soon, I just need to clean up a few things.

Dyre Controller Servers

I found some interesting connections being made to some remote servers, which appear to be a Dyre botnet. The malware attempts to make a connection to a remote server using a CONNECT request method, followed by a GET with a directory structure containing the host name of the infected machine, the version of Windows the machine is running, and the serial number.

As with any IP address, please be careful when blacklisting as they may be legitimate. Many of the IP's that I looked into were listed on several blacklists, so please do your research. Below is a quick and dirty list of the IP addresses, enjoy!

Remote IP Addresses - CONNECT:
The connections made to the below IP addresses were made with the CONNECT request method.

181.189.152.131:443
184.164.97.60:443
185.31.33.98:443
188.255.236.227:4443
188.255.241.22:4443
194.28.190.84:443
194.28.191.213:443
195.206.255.131:443
195.34.206.204:443
208.123.129.153:4443
208.123.129.218:4443
208.123.135.106:4443
212.37.81.96:4443
212.69.14.89:443
217.23.194.237:443
31.42.170.118:443
38.124.169.163:4443
46.175.23.130:443
67.206.96.30:443
67.206.97.238:443
67.207.228.144:443
67.219.166.113:443
69.118.144.195:4443
75.134.44.251:443
77.104.206.150:443
77.234.235.48:443
80.234.34.137:443
80.87.219.35:443
83.168.164.18:443
84.16.54.22:443
84.16.55.122:443
84.237.229.49:443
85.192.165.229:443
87.116.153.216:443
91.232.157.139:443
91.240.97.141:443
93.91.154.243:443
95.143.131.73:443
184.164.97.242:443
188.123.35.92:443
194.187.219.116:443
213.133.178.154:443
213.174.6.246:4443
31.134.73.151:4443
31.42.172.36:443
46.151.51.75:443
75.98.158.55:443

Remote IP Addresses - GET:
The connections made to the below IP addresses were made with the GET request method. These appear to be the controller servers.

184.164.97.242:443
188.123.35.92:443
194.187.219.116:443
213.133.178.154:443
213.174.6.246:4443
31.134.73.151:4443
31.42.172.36:443

HTTP URI Directory Structure:
The URI directory is a long value that contains unique information pertaining to the infected host. However, there are a few directories that are consistent. Keep in mind that these will only show in the URI when a GET request method has been made.

• /1106us11/
• /5/spk/

Thank you for reading, I hope this information is useful!

User-agent Sting Indicator Page Updated

I updated the user-agent string indicator page to include Wireshark display filters using regex to find specific user-agents. I am by no means a regex pro, so if anyone finds any discrepancies or can figure out a cleaner way to search with regex, then please let me know.

A few things I noticed when using regex in Wireshark display filters. I was not able to figure out how to escape an open and close parenthesis (if I did escape those characters normally, it would not find the user-agent), so I had to do a logical AND plus another display filter in order to locate the right value (please see the Dyre user-agent string). Also, I had to be more explicit with the query with a shorted user-agent string value; meaning I had to add a Start of Line and End of Line character to the query.

I hope you all find this information useful, feel free to ask questions or leave comments. Thank you.

New User-agent Indicators Page

I made a post a few months back about malicious user-agent string values. It appears to be a pretty popular post, so I decided to create a page dedicated to malicious user-agent strings.

I added several more strings to the list as well as updating some regex. Speaking of which, I still need to add more regex values to that page and I will also add some Wireshark display filters that you can use to find user-agent strings in PCAP files.

I also added a new list on the right side of the page dedicated to just indicators. You can find the new page here. Enjoy!

Indicators - Dridex

I have been seeing a large amount of emails containing malicious Microsoft Word macro-enabled documents attached. These documents, once the macro has been allowed to run by the user, will download and run an executable file to infect the machine. Below are several indicators that I have seen so far, and I have even created a Wireshark/regex filter that will help you find these files in a PCAP file.

Threat Name: Dridex

File Download Locations:
These files may no longer be active, but please use caution when downloading as they are malicious.

7sumur.com/73/20.exe
baypipo.com/55/55.exe
cellsitemanagement.com/73/20.exe
chiokings.com/88/15.exe
crestliquors.com/73/20.exe
croningroup.com/73/20.exe
dalmatian-bizhub.com/55/55.exe
deborah-abesser.com/88/15.exe
elkettasandassociates.com/25/10.exe
empreinte.com.ar/42/91.exe
footingclub.com/85/20.exe
hoinghihoithao.com/88/15.exe
jenisgroup.com/88/15.exe
joyofcamping.com/88/15.exe
kang-ning.com/353/654.exe
kapagrup.com/94/053.exe
m-bikes.gr.193-92-97-57.linuxzone26.grserver.gr/42/91.exe
mercury.powerweave.com/85/20.exe
mindfullivingprograms.com/73/20.exe
njgems.com/55/55.exe
orenkaholidays.com/5/0.exe
revistacannicas.com.ar/42/91.exe
seedsindaphne.org/85/20.exe
segurosdenotebooks.com.br/25/10.exe
thepattersonco.com/85/20.exe
tpsci.com/88/15.exe
tvteachervideos.com/42/91.exe
yubido.web.fc2.com/5/0.exe
zolghadri-co.com/25/10.exe

File Names:
The file names are numerical and 1 through 3 digits long.

0.exe
053.exe
10.exe
15.exe
20.exe
55.exe
654.exe
91.exe

IP Connections:

The malware will attempt to make CONNECT requests to the below IP addresses and ports.

144.76.238.214:4443

185.12.94.48:7443

185.12.95.191:4443

188.120.249.231:8443

70.32.74.108:7443

78.24.218.186:8443

78.46.60.131:4443

94.242.58.146:4443

Regex Query:

The following regex query should find the HTTP URI and file name of the executable file. Since the directory and file names are pretty consistent in the fact that they have been numerical values so far, it should be pretty easy to locate in your logs.

• \/[1-9]{1,3}\/[0-9]{1,3}\.exe

The following Wireshark display filter (using regex) should also work:

• http.request.uri matches "\/[1-9]{1,3}\/[0-9]{1,3}\.exe"

You should see similar information below in the Info column in Wireshark when you run the above query:

I am sure that I will be adding more indicators for this malware soon as it has been pretty prevalent over the past few weeks. Thanks for reading.

Bad Practice

I was surprised when I saw this one in some logs today. The smart phone application Parlor, exposes your username and password in the HTTP URI through their API, plain as day. These are what we like to call "easy wins" as they require no effort to find in standard event logs, and require no digging through the frames of PCAP files. Here is a screencap of the HTTP field:

Be careful when signing up for some of these applications on your smart phone, you never know what is exposed.

Indicators - Geodo Malware Part 3

Since the last two updates I have collected a few more indicators, and I have decided to make an indicator page. I didn't want to create a tracking page, as there is a much better resource, rather I wanted to create a list of indicators that I have found. Below are a few new additions that I will be adding to the new Geodo indicator list; there are no new C2 servers or use-agent strings.

Link to the Geodo indicator page.

Threat Name: Geodo

File Download Locations:

These are live malware files, download with caution.

hXXp://obchod.vianatura.cz:80/YRgXCNup2zn8/9049.exe
hXXp://f3x.pl:80/modules/mod_aratipas/ex_mss3.exe
hXXp://zonaliberabraila.ro/ud3yRXLgSw2
hXXp://marjav.cl/g3aTdqlJI8
hXXp://intellinum.com/7UPYmxe150K
hXXp://blog.northpointindia.com/gKBwOvxeq

Further Reading:

rebus snippets

Indicators - Geodo Malware Part 2

I have some more Geodo/Feodo indicators for you since yesterdays posting. If this keeps up I will make a page dedicated to Geodo indicators similar to the one I created for the Houdini RAT.

Threat Name: Geodo

File Download Locations:

These are live malware files, download with caution.

hXXp://altvramagazine.com:80/wp-content/themes/altura/cr_mss3.exe
hXXp://www.hairlosstreatments4u.com:80/4KVHAGFUPB/949.exe
hXXp://arasshahintools.com:80/wp-content/themes/darya/cr_mss3.exe
hXXp://www.greago.com:80/wp-content/themes/flowmaster/cr_mss3.exe
hXXp://holyspirit.wa.edu.au:80/wp-content/uploads/cr_mss3.exe
hXXp://heliosradio.com:80/WGNz20QXeyK/9049.exe
hXXp://photowaaley.com:80/2g9IiGaouYBOQ/9049.exe
hXXp://region-magdeburg.ramminger-berlin.de:80/modules/mod_aratipas/cr_mss3.exe
hXXp://jomigym.nl:80/80dUCBiJXg/9049.exe
hXXp://tasheelseries.com.au:80/modules/mod_aratipas/cr_mss3.exe

Virustotal File Analysis:

9049.exe

Command and Control Servers:

Request Method: POST

94.126.171.85:8080
94.176.2.168:8080
103.16.26.36:8080
37.59.0.141:8080
46.32.233.226:8080
76.74.252.88:8080
99.249.191.195:8080

Enjoy! Look out for a new indicator list for this malware.